A quiet conflict is brewing over minerals. Rare earth elements and other critical metals are in high demand. These materials power clean-energy technology, advanced weapons and the digital infrastructure of the 21st century. Countries around the world are scrambling to secure them. By 2030 this race could spark open “resource wars” as nations jostle for control of mines and processing plants.
In an era of climate goals and great-power rivalry, governments see these minerals as strategic assets. Electric vehicles, wind turbines and solar farms all rely on metals like lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare earths. High-tech weapons and jet engines need rare earth magnets and special metals. Even the fiber cables and data centers of the internet age require large amounts of copper, aluminum and silicon. All these uses add up to surging demand. As industrial and military applications grow, analysts warn that global demand for key minerals could triple by 2050 under aggressive clean-energy scenarios. That rapid growth has put pressure on supply chains and driven up prices.
The Race for Strategic Minerals
Every major power is now crafting a critical mineral strategy. Nations have identified “critical minerals” lists to target resources vital to national security. In the United States, the government has declared nearly 60 elements critical to the economy, including 17 rare earths (neodymium, dysprosium and others), plus copper, lithium, cobalt and many more. The European Union, Japan and Australia have similar lists and plans. Each country must weigh domestic supply against global competition.
Demand for these minerals is exploding. Electric vehicle sales are projected to rise from a few million today to 40–70 million per year by 2030. Each EV needs tens of kilograms of lithium, graphite, cobalt and nickel in its battery pack. Wind turbines and electric motors use heavy rare earths for powerful permanent magnets. Smartphones and computers use smaller amounts of rare earths and silver. All told, the energy transition will see demand for copper, lithium and rare earths jump dramatically. The International Energy Agency notes that under a net-zero scenario by 2050, copper demand might rise by 50%, nickel and cobalt demand could double, and lithium demand might grow eightfold.
These shifts have not gone unnoticed. Mining companies are racing to add new deposits, while governments shore up supplies. But new mines take years to build and cost billions. Smelters and refiners are even harder, because processing many of these ores requires specialized technology and heavy investment. As a result, supply chains for battery metals and rare earths are under strain. Any disruption or export ban risks halting production of cars and gadgets, and even crippling advanced weapons programs.
China’s Dominance in Rare Earths
China is at the center of this new mineral contest. Over the past two decades, Chinese firms rapidly expanded rare earth mines and built most of the world’s processing plants. Today China mines roughly two-thirds of the world’s rare earth ore and handles an even larger share of the refining. One estimate has China controlling 77% of refined rare earth output by 2030, and over 90% of important battery graphite processing. In practical terms, this means China can turn raw ore into magnets and metals far more cheaply and in greater volume than any other country.
Technicians at a Chinese rare-earth processing plant prepare to run ore through massive machines. These high-tech factories give China a commanding lead in refining. The country has dozens of such plants that crush raw mineral and extract pure elements. China’s factories process what other countries cannot: they turn muddy slurry and imported ore into magnets for motors and materials for electronics. This near-monopoly puts other nations at a disadvantage. If exports were cut off, many supply chains would stall.
Beijing has grown more assertive about this control. In 2024 Chinese authorities announced new export controls on rare earths, only to pause them after diplomatic talks. In recent years China has tightened environmental rules and quotas on rare earth mines, in effect controlling how much material reaches global markets. State leaders have described these minerals as a national security priority. Analysts note that China now runs a multi-agency campaign to enforce full-chain control of rare earth exports. They monitor shipments, crack down on illegal sales and even police smuggling routes. This campaign spans ministries of commerce, security, customs and state-owned companies. Beijing is also pouring money into new domestic exploration and refining capacity to stay ahead.
This assertiveness has roiled world markets. In 2021 the U.S., Japan and EU filed a World Trade Organization complaint against China for cutting rare earth exports and inflating prices. In 2024 Beijing’s export threat spurred frantic planning in Washington and Tokyo. By contrast, China’s own domestic market can shelter from price swings by adjusting quotas. In effect, China can squeeze foreign buyers if it wishes, while its industries get what they need. No wonder analysts sometimes call this competition a 21st-century Great Game. Western governments see rare earths as the new oil – and they want more rivals in the field.
Supply Chains and Global Risks
The raw material chains are fragile. For most critical minerals, production is concentrated in just a few places. China leads in rare earths and processing of battery metals. Indonesia is the top nickel miner. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) produces about 70% of the world’s cobalt. Chile and Argentina hold most of the lithium resources. Russia is a major nickel and palladium supplier (and a leading uranium exporter). No single country or company can yet fill the gaps if one supplier cuts output.
But resource nationalism is on the rise. Key producers are using raw materials for leverage or local industry. In 2024 Indonesia banned nickel ore exports to force more domestic smelting. The DRC surprised markets by temporarily halting all cobalt exports in early 2025. Even Russia threatened to restrict certain rare earth exports as political pressure. These moves show governments are ready to weaponize their minerals in a crisis. The fear is that if tensions flare, a mineral-rich country might refuse to sell to an unfriendly buyer – or raise prices so high that companies balk.
Geopolitics further complicate trade flows. For instance, much cobalt smelted in China comes from the DRC, but it passes through middlemen in Malaysia or Finland before final processing. Even if China imposed a ban, some companies might reroute supply through third parties. Still, the threat of a bottleneck remains real. Supply disruptions would hit not just electric car makers but also defense contractors and telecom firms.
Alliances are forming to counter these risks. The United States has been making deals with allied miners. In late 2025 the U.S. and Australia announced a multibillion-dollar partnership to co-develop a supply chain for critical minerals. Australia alone has over 40 elements that the U.S. deems critical – from lithium and rare earths to copper and vanadium. Shortly afterward, the U.S. and Japan signed a non-binding framework to jointly invest in mining and refining in countries like Australia, Canada and beyond. Europe, too, is trying to diversify. The EU has launched raw-materials pacts with African nations and stockpiles of its own. Even the NATO bloc is discussing a kind of mineral “friend-shoring” to lessen Chinese dependence.
Other nations with strategic minerals are suddenly courted. For example, a new U.S.-Ukraine mining deal gives U.S. firms access to Ukraine’s large uranium and rare-earth deposits. Kazakhstan, sitting on vast copper, zinc and nickel, is wooed by both China and the West – a case study in how critical minerals can shape foreign policy. Some observers say Central Asia could help break Europe’s dependence on Russia for certain metals. In South America, Chile and Argentina are deepening cooperation on lithium. New projects like a proposed “Lithium Alliance” aim to bind these neighbors together – and perhaps to the United States. In short, global supply risks have turned dozens of countries into potential allies or battlegrounds in the mineral race.
Environmental and Social Costs of Mining
Mining and refining critical minerals can be messy business. The operations often leave scars on land, pollute water and spark social strife. This environmental toll is itself a strategic concern. Governments and investors cannot ignore public pushback against destructive projects – especially in democracies.
At many rare-earth mines, workers spray ore with acid to separate the metals. This muddy slurry process yields toxic waste. In China and elsewhere, tailings ponds brim with heavy metals and radioactive byproducts. Nearby farmland can be contaminated, and groundwater poisoned. Miners sometimes dig deep in arid regions, consuming scarce water and displacing communities. Such scenes have played out in Inner Mongolia, Malaysia and even in U.S. experiments with rare earth mines.
Local villagers often bear the brunt of mining damage. In one Chinese village near a rare-earth mine, farmers point to streams of colored wastewater running off the site. They fear for their crops and health. Across Asia, Africa and the Americas, protests have flared over new mines. In Nevada, native groups have battled planned lithium mines on ancestral land. In Scotland and Portugal, communities have blocked rare-earth projects over toxicity fears. Environmental groups demand that “green” technologies not be built on a poisoned foundation.
These concerns complicate supply security. Ironically, even as we shift away from fossil fuels, societies must now allow more mining. That tension – needing minerals for climate tech while preserving nature – creates a policy dilemma. Some argue that recycling and innovation can ease the burden. For example, companies in the U.S. and Europe are investing in battery recycling to recover lithium and cobalt. Researchers are exploring alternative magnet technologies that use less dysprosium or neodymium. But such solutions are not yet scaled up. Today, miners often face lawsuits and delays, raising the political cost of digging a new pit.
Even when a country has its own reserves, mining politics can slow plans. In the United States, for years only one major rare earth mine (Mountain Pass, California) has operated, and it ran into bankruptcy partly over environmental issues. New projects like a promised lithium mine in Nevada have been tied up in court over endangered species and water rights. Meanwhile, indigenous groups and local ranchers demand a say in approvals. Each mine fight can stall a national push for mineral independence.
Allies, Alternatives, and New Sources
Faced with these pressures, countries are pursuing every alternative. Australia has become a critical player: it already produces most of the world’s lithium and is second only to China in rare earths. Canadian and U.S. firms are tapping mines in Australia to secure Western access. Japan has invested billions in overseas mines and stocks up on elements like nickel. The EU launched a plan to assess its own mineral wealth – from Norway’s graphite to Finland’s lithium.
African nations are in the spotlight too. The DRC, with its cobalt and copper, is being courted by China and the West alike. Zambia’s copper belt and Namibia’s uranium are seen as strategic. Even small players count: Mongolia and Greenland have rare earth deposits that could serve allies. In 2025, Iceland and Finland announced a European effort to mine and process lithium domestically to cut Russian gas dependency from lithium-ion supply, in a parallel to energy security.
Meanwhile, efforts continue to break China’s monopoly. Some Western firms have opened processing plants outside China. For example, a U.S.-French venture now refines rare earths in France. Australia is building new refineries with Japanese backing. Rare earth magnets are being made in Germany and the U.S. for the first time in decades. These moves raise the share of non-Chinese supply, but they take time and money.
No alliance or mine will singlehandedly solve the problem. Many countries remain dependent on trade. The Pentagon cautions that “the minerals market does not operate like oil,” meaning no one country controls all sources of a given metal. Spreading out production – across Australia, Africa, the Americas, and even some recycled sources – is the best hope to reduce risk. Global leaders are increasingly convinced that cooperation among friends is the only cure: no nation can onshore every ore or build every refinery alone.
The U.S. Push for Mineral Independence
For the United States, critical minerals are now a declared national priority. Policymakers say the nation must end decades of mining inaction that left it reliant on foreign sources (notably China). The U.S. government has taken a series of steps to boost domestic supply and protect allies’ chains.
In Washington, a whole-of-government plan has emerged. New laws and budgets pour billions into mineral projects. The Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act funneled money to battery factories and mining ventures. A recent Defense Department report even lists some minerals on par with munitions for national security. The U.S. Geological Survey has named 60 “essential” minerals and urged more domestic mining and processing. The President and Congress have pushed stockpiling – for example, keeping reserves of rare earth oxides.
On the ground, private firms are opening mines and plants. The Mountain Pass rare earth mine in California has restarted operations and sends ore to an Alabama refinery. Lithium deposits in Nevada and Arkansas are under development. Efforts to extract rare lithium from oilfield wastewater are underway. Several planned mining sites, like a large copper mine in Arizona, target critical metals. The Interior Department has approved more exploration leases for key minerals. Environmental studies are faster now for some projects, though opposition still delays certain mines.
Recycling and technology innovation form another front of U.S. strategy. American companies are building battery and electronics recycling centers to reclaim cobalt, nickel and rare earths from scrap. The goal is to tap the 5–10% of lost or discarded materials and lessen the need for new digs. Researchers are also seeking domestic substitutes – for example, mining magnesium instead of aluminum for EVs, or developing motors that need fewer rare earths.
In diplomacy, the U.S. seeks partners rather than projects alone. Washington has launched several joint initiatives, like the U.S.-Australia Critical Minerals agreement and the U.S.-Japan rare earth tie-up. North American cooperation is expanding too, with Canada gaining access to U.S. funding for its own mines. Even a trilateral U.S.-India-Australia group on critical minerals has been discussed. These efforts aim to make allies share risk.
Despite this urgency, experts caution that achieving full independence is impossible. The U.S. still lacks enough raw resources of certain elements to meet every target (its known lithium, nickel and cobalt reserves can’t cover all projected EV demand, for instance). And refining facilities for some metals would cost hundreds of millions. Thus, officials admit the plan is to domesticate as much supply as feasible while keeping access to friendly partners.
Toward 2030: Resource Wars on the Horizon?
The stakes could not be higher. By 2030 the world may depend on clean energy and digital tech more than ever. At the same time, great-power tension is rising. Some analysts warn that competition for minerals could heat into real conflict, or at least very nasty trade wars. If one country cuts off a supply of, say, neodymium for magnets or manganese for batteries, it could slow an adversary’s military and economy. In that sense, critical minerals are an indirect weapon.
For now, the battles are mostly economic and political. They play out in investment deals, export limits and lobbying, not in tanks or jets. But the analogies to past resource struggles are uncanny: once oil loomed, alliances and conflicts formed around it. Today minerals like lithium and rare earths are shaping alliances and rivalries.
To avoid grinding shortages, experts say nations must speed up mining, recycle aggressively, and cooperate on shared security. The alternative is bitter dependency and crisis if supplies break. If current trends continue without relief, observers say we could see flashpoints where countries block shipments or sanction each other over minerals. The phrase “resource wars 2030” may sound extreme, but officials are already planning for worst-case scenarios.
In the end, 2030 could be a turning point. By then, much of the new energy and tech infrastructure will be in place. If the raw materials have been secured and diversified, the transition will proceed more smoothly. If not, the scramble will intensify. Policy choices today will decide whether the next decade is marked by cooperation – allied supply pacts and secure trade – or by conflict over who controls the earth’s treasures.
